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RCAF Douglas Digby 742 (DfAp-10)

Posted by Lisa M. Daly on 19 February 2016
Posted in: Crash investigation. Tagged: , , , , , , , . Leave a Comment

My originally scheduled post was supposed to be a review of A Gentlemen’s Agreement: Newfoundland and the Struggle for Transatlantic Air Supremacy by Robert C. Stone, but I still have half of the book to read. I figured it would be unfair to quickly read the remainder of the book just for a blog review, so instead I am posting the next scheduled post instead. This was first adapted from my own thesis, then a version of it posted on the Gander Airport Historical Society page under their Warbird Down section. So, while you may not know my planned schedule, I really am trying my best to stick to it this year to bring you new content every second week.

On to explore RCAF Digby 742, crashed at Gander. For video of this site, please see my Land and Sea episode “Fallen War Birds“.

Measuring the debris field. Photo by author, 2010.

Measuring the debris field. Photo by author, 2010.

Perhaps the most notable thing about this site is how little it has changed since the crash.

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Some of the Digby that remains on the site. Note the similarity to the picture below. Photo by author, 2014.

Image of the RCAF Digby wreckage taken during the crash investigation. Note the similarity in the site picture from 2014 (above). From Heakes 1941.

Image of the RCAF Digby wreckage taken during the crash investigation. Note the similarity in the site picture from 2014 (above). From Heakes 1941.

At 1856 GMT on 24 July 1941, RCAF Douglas Digby 742 left Gander with a crew of six for the purpose of convoy patrols. At 2320 GMT the weather began to deteriorate and the Meteorological Office predicted that the ceiling would remain at about 1500 feet with showers. At 2326 GMT the aircraft was recalled, but Digby 742 did not immediately respond. The recall notice was repeated four times by Gander Station and twice by RCAF Station, Sydney. The recall was acknowledged at 0030 GMT and at 0151 GMT the aircraft was in range of the Gander airbase. Digby 742 was spotted by Airport Control, but the aircraft reported that it could not see the airport. By this time, the ceiling had deteriorated to 200 feet with rain and increased wind and the cloud had begun to blow across the runway. When Digby 742 arrived, RCAF Digby 756 was attempting to land at Gander and Digby 742 was instructed to circle until Digby 756 had landed. Digby 756 landed safely at 0219 GMT but for approximately the next twenty minutes, Digby 742 was out of communication range. Captain Tomsett was instructed to proceed to Dartmouth where the weather conditions were more favourable but the Captain stated that he would attempt to land at Gander one final time and would proceed to Dartmouth if that landing was unsuccessful. At 0310 GMT a loud explosion was heard and there was no further communication with the aircraft. At 0330 GMT, the ceiling began to steadily rise becoming 1400 feet by 0530 GMT (Heakes 1941).

Name Rank Serial Number Unit Duty Injuries
Tomsett, M.E. F/Lt. C.1069 10 (BR) Pilot Fatally
Mather, W.H. P/O J.3479 10 (BR) Pilot Fatally
Pratt, A.G. P/O 10 (BR) Navigator Fatally
Hunt, M.S. Sgt. R60720 10 (BR) Air Gunner Fatally
MacDavid, R.L. Sgt. R73032 10 (BR) Air Gunner Fatally
Crawford, T.J.E. AC 1 R65641 10 (BR) Wireless Fatally

Crew list for RCAF Digby 742. Adapted from Heakes 1941

At first light, two aircraft were dispatched to search for Digby 742. The wreck was located almost immediately after take-off and a ground party which had been organized during the night was sent out to the scene of the accident. F/L MacLennan, Medical Officer at the RCAF Station Hospital, was in the ground party and assessed the injuries of the crew. The bodies were located throughout the site, and in some cases were thrown as far as 240 feet from the main wreckage. All of the crew except Sgt. MacDavid died instantly; MacDavid succumbed to his injuries shortly after the accident. All crew were found to have extensive injuries, and in all cases except for AC 1 Crawford, showed fractures to the skull and long bones. Crawford sustained massive trauma to the abdominal and thoracic areas, causing death. When the crew were examined they were all in a state of rigor mortis (Heakes 1941). As a result of this crash, it was believed that there would be further casualties in Gander, so an area was selected for the Commonwealth War Graves and these airmen were the first RCAF crew to be buried in Gander (Heakes 1941; Pattison 1941; Walker 2002).

Map of the debris field. Daly 2015.

Map of the debris field. Daly 2015.

The accident report gives the evidence that the aircraft came in too low and the starboard wing struck the bog, resulting in the crash. It states:

From the furrow out in the ground it appears that the starboard wing tip struck the ground after which the aircraft cartwheeled resulting in the wing, nose and engines being torn from the fuselage and the fuselage breaking in the centre behind the bomb-bay (Heakes 1941).

Where the wing struck the bog in 1941 is still visible. Note the debris in the scar. Photo by author, 2010.

Where the wing struck the bog in 1941 is still visible. Note the debris in the scar. Photo by author, 2010.

The archaeological map of the site agrees with this assessment. The scar where the wing tip struck is still visible and does contain some aircraft debris. The artifacts in the scar could not be measured accurately to be placed on the map because while the whole area is unstable, the areas that were damaged in the crash are much too unstable to walk on. The wings are to the northwest of the impact point, and the tail is partially submerged to the east of the impact point. The cockpit was not visible and may have been destroyed by investigators or sank through the bog. One piece in an open area of water could not be measured in the field and was measured from GoogleEarth images. This piece, which looked like a section of engine cowling, is approximately 260 feet (75 meters) from the main area of wreckage: the tail and rear end of the fuselage. This could be approximately where the bodies of P/O Pratt and AC 1 Crawford were located as the witness statement states:

I was shown the body of P/O Pratt. The body was 240 feet from the main wreckage, body partly submerged in a small pond, face and head above water. […] I was shown the body of AC 1 Crawford, T.J. The body was 220 feet from the main mass wreckage and was attached to seat [sic]. It was found in the small pond with head submerged in water (Heakes 1941).

Approximate location of the wreckage. Google Earth.

Approximate location of the wreckage. Google Earth.

The engines were in good condition prior to take-off and the aircraft had passed inspection. The altimeter settings had been passed on to the aircraft more than once, but Digby 742 never acknowledged receiving them. Salvage of the aircraft was requested, but given that the engines and bombs had sunk beneath the bog, Eastern Air Command in Halifax determined that the salvage values of the engines would not warrant the expenditure necessary to drain the bog to retrieve them. Similarly, due to the boggy nature of the area, it was believed that the six-hundred-pound live bombs from the aircraft would soon rust through to become inert and up to that point the area should be treated with caution. Until the bombs were determined to be inert, it would be unsafe to attempt salvage operations, especially of the engines (Heakes 1941).

Excerpt from the 1941 crash report discussing the viability of recovering the engines. From Heakes 1941.

Excerpt from the 1941 crash report discussing the viability of recovering the engines. From Heakes 1941.

Although weather conditions had deteriorated, at this time there were no regulations for minimum ceiling. The conditions that were present at the time of the crash were poor and landing should only have been attempted by an experience pilot. As a result of this crash, recommendations were made to the RCAF to put in place regulations for landing in poor conditions based on the time of day (day or night flying) and the experience of the pilot; an experienced pilot is considered to have completed at least 300 hours of flying on that specific type of aircraft. The determination that weather conditions are poor would be based on the ceiling level and at the discretion of the Aerodrome Control Officer (Heakes 1941).

Based on images taken after the initial accident compared to the site in 2010 and 2014, it looks as if the wreckage has been relatively untouched since the incident. The major change visible is a slow settling and sinking of the aircraft into the bog. As well, the different times of year will make the site look different depending on the amount of recent precipitation.  As stated in the incident report, the heavier items, such as the engine and the bombs sank under the bog before investigators reached the site, so the assumption can be made that any other heavy pieces of the aircraft, especially those with a small surface area, sank as well. What does remain are essentially pieces of aluminum of varying sizes (from small fragments of a few inches to a large wing section) “floating” on the bog. This does leave the site relatively intact since the crash, and thus allows for a better idea of the crash mechanics (Young 2014). As seen above, the crash report was detailed regarding the mechanics of the crash, and looking at the site it is possible to see the site similarly to how it was seen in 1941. In this case, the incident report has been able to inform the researcher and point out other areas, such as the engine cowling in a nearby area of open water, where debris can be found. This makes this site one of the most intact in the Gander area that has so far been examined by archaeologists.

What remains of the wings, "floating" on the bog. Photo by author, 2010.

What remains of the wings, “floating” on the bog. Photo by author, 2010.

That said, there is evidence that people have visited the site.  As is typical for known crash sites, a yellow X was painted on one of the larger pieces of wreckage. Names and dates of site visitors have been scratched into that paint. The majority of these names date between 1961 and 1968 and between 1983 and 1999. The Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA) was opened in 1970, which most likely prevented access to the site (RCAF 2009). According to staff at the facility, the antenna near the crash site was inactive in the 1980s and erected again in 2000, making the easiest access route to the crash site a restricted area (Fudge 2010). In fact, this researcher had to be escorted through the boundaries of the CDAA to gain access to the site. Because the site is still in operation, there is limited information about the area except that it is restricted.

Graffiti on the aircraft wreckage. Photo by author, 2010.

Graffiti on the aircraft wreckage. Photo by author, 2010.

While this site can be accessed by other routes, it is not recommended as the site is unstable, especially near the debris and the scar from where the wing struck, and visitors are at risk due to the unstable nature of this bog (Hillier 2010). In fact, which investigating the site, even walking near a fragment of aircraft could cause it to shift on the landscape. As well, according to a bomb disposal expert with the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary, caution should still be taken on site until the time that the status of the bombs can be determined (Deacey 2011). The incident report believed that the bombs would be deactivated as they would rust through in the bog, but this may not be the case as bogs are environments that can actually preserve materials rather than destroy them.

Some of the Digby that remains on the site. Photo by author, 2014.

Some of the Digby that remains on the site. Photo by author, 2014.

 

References

Daly, L.
2015      Aviation Archaeology of World War II Gander: An Examination of Military and Civilian Life at the Newfoundland Airport. Doctoral (PhD) thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland.

Deacey, C. (RNC)
2012      Personal Communication

Fudge, M. (CAF)
2010      Personal Communication

Heakes, F.V.
1941      Douglas Digby Aircraft No. 742 Fatal Accident to Above at Newfoundland on 25-7-41. Department of National Defence – Canada RCAF, Gander, Newfoundland.

Hillier, D. (Newfoundland aviation historian)
2010      Personal Communication

RCAF (Royal Canadian Air Force)
2009      9 Wing Gander: History. http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/9w-9e/page-eng.asp?id=509 (accessed 28 Aug 2012).

Pattison, H.A.
1941      Letter to the Secretary for Public Works 10 February 1941. On file, Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, GN Box S5-5-2.

Walker, R.W.R
2012      Canadian Military Aircraft Serial Numbers, http://www.ody.ca/~bwalker/index.htm (accessed 13 Sept 2012).

Young, D. (Aircraft maintenance engineer)
2014      Personal Communication

Review: Pathfinder by Air Vice-Marshal Donald Bennett CB CBE DSO

Posted by Lisa M. Daly on 22 January 2016
Posted in: Book Review. Tagged: , , , , , . 2 comments

Ten years after VJ Day, Donald Bennett started his memoirs of World War II. Bennett was a pioneer in long-distance aviaiton before WWII, and held many distance records. He was also the commander of the Pathfinder Force, a team dedicated to marking targets for Bomber Command, increasing the latter’s accuracy, particularly in night bombing raids.

Bennett’s memoir looks at his life in Australia and how he ended up in the Royal Air Force, his early flights and work as a navigator, and his time in the war. He is honest in his memoir, and often comments on the burocracy and the problems associated with the RAF and the chain of command. Bennett’s style is passionate and exciting, whether he is describing scientific advancements, bomb runs or the politics of war. Readers may or may not agree with his political or social ideas, but his entire memoir is thrilling and, especially during the war, Bennett lead an exciting life. For anyone interested in aviation history it is an important read and depects a number of important aviation events in the Second World War including Bomber Command missions, their involvement in D-Day and bringing POWs home after the war.

As this blog is focused on Newfoundland aviation history, this post is going to focus on the section of this memoir associated with the establishment of Ferry Command.

When Bennett was tasked with flying Hudsons from Gander to England, he immediately noted how it was assumed he would sit by until it was time to attempt the flight. What is clear in his memoir is that he never sat idly by and thus was involved in every part of preparing the aircraft for the transatlantic flight, from initial test flights at the Lockheed facility in California to the actual trans-Atlantic flight. This section really shows Bennett’s abilities as a pilot throughout the memoir he will often be the first to fly a test aircraft, or demonstrate the capabilities of an aircraft to make sure it meets his exacting standards.

Donald Bennett.

Donald Bennett.

Once the aircraft were altered to his specifications (mostly more fuel), Bennett hitched a ride back to Montreal on one of the Hudsons. For diplomatic reasons, he could not fly the aircraft, but rode as a passenger. He complains that they stuck to the airways, which he felt added both risk and distance to the flight. At one point they flew through a heavy thunderstorm and remained in relatively thick airline traffic the entire route. While Bennett found the American manufacturers to be highly efficient and British manufacturers could learn from them, he comments that he feels this was, and at the time of his writing, still is a major problem with American aviation. They landed at Pembina on the Canadian border just south of Winnipeg where the engines were shut off and a horse was hitched to the front of the aircraft to pull it across the border. Once across the border they flew to Winnipeg for the night.

After a few more night stops, they made it to Montreal to meet the new pilots. Most of the pilots interviewed were Americans who had been thrown out of American airlines! The push for American pilots came to be because, on Lord Beaverbrook’s instruction, Washington was offering extremely high rates of pay for pilots who would fly the Atlantic. This actually caused many problems because the English who were flying the same route were working for significantly less money than the Americans who were “rejected” from American airlines. [Note: as the war progressed, some pilots signed up for Ferry Command to avoid being drafted and to decide how they would serve the war effort, such as American businessman and philanthropist Kirk Kirkorian (Torgerson 1974)]. Only Americans were offered the higher pay, and British subjects from Canada, Newfoundland and Australia who wanted to fly had to be content with lower wages. Bennett states that he felt the higher wages were unnecessary and enough pilots could have been found without what he calls that “pathetic piece of bribery”.

A statue of Lord Beaverbrook in Fredericton, New Brunswick. Photo by author.

A statue of Lord Beaverbrook in Fredericton, New Brunswick. Photo by author.

With two Hudsons now in Montreal and pilots selected, training began. Bennett notes that Hudsons had some tricky characteristics, such as “an ability to drop a wing if bounced” and a habit of stalling if they were going to slow, so extensive training was necessary.

While the new pilots were training, Bennett was already thinking about means to return the crews, and was consulting with Consolidated about getting B-24s for the return flights. The first few returns were by ship, but eventually it was arranged to transport pilots back with B-24s, as well hundreds, if not thousands, of B-24s were flown across the Atlantic.

A few weeks later, crews and aircraft were ready and flew in formation to Gander. There were not enough navigators for the aircraft, so they had to rely on the lead aircraft. Bennett states that this was certainly not ideal, but unavoidable. The station-keeping lights on the rear of the aircraft were quite bright to help. An additional eight British Overseas Airways Corporation pilots and nine radio operators joined the team. They were all experienced pilots, but had not flown the Atlantic themselves. Bennett considered them to be higher calibre pilots, and ensured at least one on each of the aircraft following the lead.

On 9 November 1940, Bennett arrived in Gander and signalled for all aircraft to prepare for immediate departure. Unfortunately, the aircraft were too iced up (about a half inch of “steel-like” ice on the top surfaces of the wings, the fuselage and the tail) so he decided to postpone the departure for twenty-four hours. With the guidance of McTaggert-Cowan, the Meterological officer, Bennett planned the flight and briefed the crews. McTaggert-Cowan’s forecast was not perfect, according to Bennett, but extrememly valuable. Bennett had detailed instructions for the crews in case of weather, seperation, etc. and gave out cards with full cruising instructions. After the briefing, Mrs. Patterson, the wife of the airport manager and the only woman at the airport at the time, gave everyone poppies to wear the following day.

Hudson Bomber on display at the North Atlantic Aviation Museum in Gander.

Hudson Bomber on display at the North Atlantic Aviation Museum in Gander. Photo by author.

A few hours after sunset, the aircraft took off in quick succession in reasonably good weather and gathered in formation with Bennett in the lead. This was the first attempt to cross the Atlantic in the middle of November and was considered to be after the “winter barrier”. Bennett spent most of the flight focused on navigation, and was so focused that he did not notice until midway through the flight that his second pilot, Clauswitz, was wearing cowboy boots for luck!

The aircraft met a weather front that they were expecting a little sooner than anticipated. Bennett could not climb over it, so signalled for the aircraft to separate as they went through it. Once through the front, visibility was good and Bennett and four other aircraft landed at Aldergrove. Two aircraft had gone off course, but made it to the Scottish  islands. Bennett does not go into this, but Lord Beaverbrook had stated that if 3 of the 7 aircraft succeeded in crossing the Atlantic it would be sufficient to begin regular ferrying (Ministry of Information 2005). Getting all seven Hudsons across is a testament to Bennett’s leadership and planning.

The crews, much to their disappointment, were almost immediately sent back to Canada while Bennett continued to London to report to Lord Beaverbrook. Bennett then discusses some of the planning, new crew members and the difficulties in trying to convince Lord Beaverbrook that more navigators were needed for future flights, plus some of the misunderstanding that came from a lack of understanding just how cold Canadian and Newfoundland winters can be. Eventually, Bennett did manage to prove that flying in formation in the winter was not practical and had caused some crashes and technical troubles, but no fatalities. This proved to the RAF that more navigators were needed for the crossings. The terms of the agreement were that pilots would remain with Ferry Command, but navigators would be trained and would remain for only one trip each. This system seemed to work well.

While Bennett was on business in Montreal, the first major crash occurred. A Hudson was missing for 48 hours, and upon hearing this, Bennett’s first act was to get in touch with the pilot’s wife to ask her if she thought her husband was alive. She said she was certain of it. Bennett took off for Gander, and was pleased to know a search had commenced, but many crew were furious that the search had been delayed in the first place. The aircraft was located, and the pilot, Mackey, had written a message in the snow “Three dead”. Supplies were dropped for the sole survivor, and as a rescue was being planned, locals with a dog sledge were spotted and were directed to the crash site. Mackey was brought to Musgrave Harbour while arrangements were made to investigate the crash. Bennett found the remains of his crew and Dr. Fredrick Banting, the discoverer of insulin and a VIP who was being transported overseas who died from his injuries after the crash.

Plaque at the crash site.

Plaque at the crash site. Source.

The Banting crash site near Musgrave Harbour. ONeill 2008.

The Banting crash site near Musgrave Harbour. ONeill 2008.

In 1941 Bennett’s association with Ferry Command came to an end. As the United States had entered the war, the task of ferrying aircraft was being passed to them. At the same time, the RAF were getting more involved, and some of those getting involved were not individuals that Bennett got along with. Operations were passed on to Harold Long and Bennett eventually went on the lead the Path Finder Force. He does note that within six weeks of leaving Ferry Command three B-24s were lost; one failed to clear a mountain, another had a load that was too heavy and did not get off the runway and the third was due to improper Flight Control orders near Gander. In this time six Hudsons were also lost, which the authorities tried to blame on McTaggert-Cowan. Bennett, in an attempt to help, wrote a letter supporting McTaggert-Cowan’s abilities in forecasting to alleviate this blame.

Thus ends Bennett’s work in Gander. The memoir then goes into great detail about his work with the Path Finder Force, which is certainly worth reading. In this case, I am looking to summarize his involvement in Gander to keep the focus on Newfoundland aviation history.

 

Sources:

Bennett, D.C.T.

1958    Pathfinder. Guernsey Press, Guernsey.

Ministry of Information

2005    Atlantic Bridge: The Official Account of R.A.F. Ferry Command’s Ocean Ferry, University Press of the Pacific, United States.

Torgerson, D.

1974    Kerkorian: An American Success Story. The Dial Press, New York.